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Do Red and Blue Make Green?
An Analysis of the League of Conservation
Voters Congressional Scorecards
Patrick Fisher & Michael Taylor
Seton Hall University
Vote scores, given annually to the members of Congress
by the League of Conservation
Voters ( LCV) , measurP
the degree to which legislators
support
environmental
policies.
Higher LCV vote scores represent a relatively
pro -e nvironmental
stance.
We find that (i) Democratic
representatives
are seen b y the LCV as far better advoca tes of the environment
than Republican
repr ese ntatives , (ii) the LCV vote score
of representatives
,
regardless
of party affiliation,
improved as the support
for Democratic
presidential
candidates
in their constituency
increased,
(iii) the LCV vote score of representatives
increased
with the median per capita in co me
of their c onstituency,
and (iv) regional differenc es are
found in LCV vote scores, with representatives
from the
Northeast
having higher LCV scores and representatives from the South having lower LCV scores. Finally ,
these
variables
have consistently
become
more explanatory
in determining
LCV vote scores over time .

E

nvironmental policy describes a broad set of public policies with goals that range from the protection of human
health and safety from air and water pollution to the preservation of culturally important natural landmarks. The responsibility for and authority of environmental policy is most commonly shared among federal, state, and local governments. The
majority of federal statutes considered to be the foundation of
United States environmental policy were first enacted in the
1970s. Prior to this time, the issues associated with the natural
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environment were considered to be the exclusive domain of state
and local governments. A growing understanding of the impact
of pollution and environmental quality on human health, combined with the tendency of these impacts to affect individuals
across state borders led Congress to take a more critical role in
shaping a comprehensive and centralized body of environmental
policy through legislative and budgetary control.
Vote scores, annually given to members of Congress by the
League of Conservation Voters (LCV), measure the degree to
which legislators support environmental policy. Higher LCV
scores reflect a greater pro-environmental commitment. We examine how various legislator and constituency characteristics
(party affiliation, presidential candidate support, per capita income, and region) affect LCV vote scores in the House of Representatives.
Interest Group Vote Ratings and the LCV Scorecard

In order to influence the political process, interest groups
publish ratings of members of Congress. A problematic aspect of
interest groups is that they may have a polarizing effect on legislators. The leaders of interest groups tend to have more ideologically extreme opinions than the mass public (Kirkpatrick, 1976).
Attempts by legislators to take moderate positions may invoke
criticism from interest groups at both ends of the ideological
spectrum. The influence of interest groups will tend to encourage
legislators to move away from moderate positions (Poole and
Rosenthal, 1997).
Interest groups that issue vote ratings can focus on relatively
narrowly defined issues, such as environmental policy (e.g.,
League of Conservation Voters) or gun rights (e.g., National Rifle Association). They can also encompass a broad spectrum of
public policy issues (e.g., Americans for Democratic Action).
Labor unions (e.g., United Auto Workers), business and industry
T II E JOURNAL
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associations (e.g., Chamber of Commerce), and farm organizations (e.g., National Farmers Union) all rate members of Congress according to votes that are considered important to them
(Poole and Rosenthal, 1997).
The LCV scores are an index of environmental support constructed from a subset of the roll call votes of Congressional
members. Each year the LCV chooses the particular bills that it
views as most significant in terms of environmental protection.
Vote scores reflect the frequency with which the roll call votes of
Congressional members correspond to the pro-environment position endorsed by the LCV. Scores range from 0 to 100, where a
score of zero indicates the member of Congress voted in opposition to all of the LCV endorsed positions, and a score of I 00 indicates full support of LCV positions.
Before moving on to our analysis of the LCV vote scores, it is
important to note that interest group ratings should not be viewed
as an irreproachable indicator of a representative's intentions. A
basic weakness of using interest group rating scores is that they
are based on a relatively small number of roll calls (Kiewiet and
McCubbins, 1991). Thus, individual votes can be given more
weight as a determinant of overall legislative behavior than is
appropriate. Also, the choice of the roll call votes selected for
constructing the score can lead to legislators being portrayed as
more extreme than is actually the case (Snyder, 1992). Furthermore, many important decisions that legislators make, such as
votes during committee sessions, are not calculated into interest
group vote ratings. For all of these reasons, LCV vote scores
should not be used as a cardinal measure of legislator behavior.
However, they can be used effectively as an ordinal measure of
environmental support relative to other legislators.
VOL. 34 2006
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Potential Influences on LCV Vote Score

What accounts for the differences among members of Congress for support of pro-environmental legislation? What are the
characteristics of legislators who are more likely to support legislation conducive toward protecting the environment, as measured by the League of Conservation Voters?
The role of ideology in explaining the voting behavior of
members of Congress has been the focus of a great deal of research (Peltzman, 1984; Kalt and Zupan, 1984; 1990; Poole and
Rosenthal, 1991; 1997; Jackson and Kingdon, 1992; Bender and
Lott, 1996; Heckman and Snyder, 1997; Nelson, 2002). Ideology
has been conceptualized as both a useful signal of future voting
patterns, and as a summary of the personal beliefs and preferences of the representative. The former conception conceives
ideology as a means of reducing electorate uncertainty regarding
a representative's stance on future issues. The latter conception
models ideology as a potential source of conflict with the pursuit
of constituency preferences .
While these two conceptions of ideology are not necessarily
mutually exclusive, empirically distinguishing between them is
difficult, and this complicates the measurement of ideology in
practice (Nelson, 2002). Heckman and Snyder ( 1997), utilizing a
data-intensive analysis of roll call votes finds that ideology, in
general, is determined predominately by party affiliation and
regional loyalty of the representative . In terms of environmental
voting, Nelson (2002) agreed that "while pure ideology plays a
role in Senate voting on the environment, a sizeable portion is
explained by party and regional loyalty."
Constituency interests undeniably play an important role in
congressional decision-making. Since members of Congress
would like to be reelected, constituency pressures impose meaningful constraints on voting behavior (Fisher, 2005; Fiorina,
1996; Kingdon, 1989; Fenno, 1978). Representatives who desire
THE JOURNAL

OF POLITICAL

SCIENCE

DO RED AND BLUE MAKE GREEN?

41

to win reelection can be expected to act in concurrence with the
preferences of their constituents (Downs, 1957). Members of
Congress will thus be attentive to the people that they are elected
to represent. Environmental policy, like all public policy, will
impart unequal benefits and costs across citizens in different
communities. Therefore, the demographics of a Congressional
representative's constituency can play an important role in how
they vote on particular issues. Heterogeneity of electorates has
been found to be an important factor in determining roll call
votes (Bailey and Brady, 1998). Thus, the nature of congressional representation may encourage members of Congress to
have parochial interests when it comes to environmental legislation. Potential influences on the LCV vote scores include partisanship, presidential vote in congressional district, constituency
per capita income, and region.
This study does not attempt to measure ideology, but instead
focuses on the direct effects of constituency variables on the environmental voting patterns of members of the U.S. House of
Representatives as measured by relative LCV scores. However,
we anticipate that our results will be similar to those found by
Nelson (2002) for the U.S. Senate. In particular, we expect to
find that party affiliation and regional loyalty explain the majority of the variation of voting patterns on environmental issues
among members of the U.S. House from 1993 - 2004 .

Partisanship
Officially, the LCV is a nonpartisan entity, but it is possible
that there may be partisan patterns as to which legislators are
rated highly by the organization. When an interest group such as
the LCV takes a position on an issue, it can be interpreted as a
liberal/conservative issue (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). Members
of Congress tend to have a bias toward certain groups and interests, which is in tum determined to some degree by their party
\'OL . 34 2006
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affiliation (Fisher, 2005; Fenno, 1978; Clausen, 1973). Candidates, therefore, respond to different portions of their constituencies (Fenno, 1978; Fiorina, 1974). Partisanship, however, is not
an infallible predictor. Roll calls often split one or both of the
parties. These splits are due at least in part to the fact that legislators have parochial interests (Fisher, 2005). Given the nature of a
member's support, it can be to the benefit of individual members
of Congress to go out of their way to protect the interests and
preferences of his or her partisan electoral coalition.
A strong partisan relationship is increasingly found to influence the direction of congressional roll call votes across the policy spectrum. This can be attributed to the ideological
polarization of the major parties since the mid- l 970s (Poole and
Rosenthal, 1997). However, even though partisan elites have become more polarized on issues such as the environment, mass
partisans have not necessarily followed suit (Lindaman and
Haider-Markel, 2002). Despite evidence of substantial party divergence concerning support of environmental legislation among
Congressional representatives (Shipan and Lowry, 2001), recent
opinion polls reveal that the difference among partisan voters
may not be as great. For example, 81 % of registered voters supported either stronger environmental regulations or stricter enforcement of existing environmental laws, with 87% of
Democrats, 86% of Independents, and 70% of Republicans holding this belief (Greenberg, Quinlan, Rosner Researchffarrance
Group Telephone Survey March 13-19, 2002).
The early history of Congressional environmental policy was
marked by strong support from both Republicans and Democrats. Throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s the cornerstones
of environmental policy such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act, were enacted with
strong bi-partisan support in Congress (Kraft, 1995; Karnieniecki, 1995). However, since the erosion of bi-partisan support
TIIEJOURNAL
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in the early 1990s, Congress has struggled to find consensus to
enact new legislation and to reauthorize or amend existing statutes (Kraft, 2000).
Comparing the mean Democratic and Republican LCV scores
in the House from the 103rd Congress (1993-1994) to the 1081h
Congress (2003-04) displays the large partisan split that has developed on environmental issues in recent years (see Table I).
Democratic representatives had an average LCV vote score ranging from 68-81 while Republican representatives had an average
LCV vote score ranging froml 2-24. The partisan differences are
large for every Congress from the 103rd - 108th • And, if anything,
the partisan polarization on environmental issues has become
even more significant with time: average Democratic LCV vote
scores went up from 69 during the 103rd Congress to 83 in the
Iogth Congress while average Republican LCV vote scores
trended in the opposite dfrection: from nearly 24 in 103rd Congress down to 13 during the 1081h Congress.
Table 1
Mean League of Conservation V.lters Congressional Vote Scores by Party
House of Representatives
/0 3"1Congress ( /993 -94)
104'' Congress ( /995-96)
!OS'' Congress (1997-98)
106'' Congress (1999-2000)
101 " Congress (2001-02)
I 08'' Congress (2003-04)
***p < .001: **p < .0 1: *p < .05

Democrats
69.17
74.20
70.63
76.73
79.60
83.33

Republicans
23.97
20.68
25.18
17.71
16.82
13.00

T-Ratio
22.579***
24.056***
19.578***
29.070***
32.360***
37.282***

Pres idential Vote in District

As the leader of his party the president represents a direct link
to citizen and party preferences and policies and will seek to
promote these preferences in Congress. As chief diplomat (i.e.,
defining national interests relative to other countries and the
\'OL. 34 2006
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world) and chief executive (i.e., oversight of staff and the complex activities of the federal bureaucracy responsible for the majority of domestic policy) the president can exert a great deal of
influence over environmental policy (Soden , I 999). Since the
president unquestionably affects congressional environmental
decisions, the president 's popularity in one's district may influence the direction of a legislator 's vote on environmental legislation .
To appraise constituency support for the president, our examination of the LCV vote scores will utilize the percentage of
the vote each member 's district gave to the Democratic nominee
for president in the previous presidential election for each Congress that we study. Presidential vote share in the district, therefore, will be used as a rough surrogate for constituency ideology
on environmental issues . It would be expected, for example, that
those districts that gave Democratic presidential nominees a
higher percentage of the vote would ~ore likely elect representatives who would support Democratic environmental actions.
Constituency Per Capita Income
Income can play a large role in determining whether an individual supports environmental policy. The environmental justice
literature has confirmed that the citizens of poor and minority
communities are disproportionately exposed to environmental
hazards (Bullard, 1990; Been , 1993). This fact would make one
believe that the poorest households would be the most supportive
of environmental policy. However, the poorest households may
also have the most to lose in supporting environmental protection policies. Budgetary spending allocated to environmental
policy competes for the same federal dollars that assist the poor
through social spending programs. The increased disposable income of wealthier households makes them more likely to support
additional spending on environmental protection . However, they
T l I E JOURNAL
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are more capable of purchasing improvements on their own (i.e.,
country club memberships, changing residence), and are less
likely to feel the same urgency for increased environmental protection (Kahn, 2002). In addition, wealthier households may pay
a disproportionate amount of the tax revenue for improvements
that accrue primarily in other communities.
While there are conflicting conjectures regarding the effect of
changes in income at the household level on support for environmental policy, previous studies have shown that increases in
the average income within a district increases district-wide support for environmental policy. Elliot, Regens, and Seldon (1995)
show an increase in national per-capita GNP have been an important factor in increasing public support for environmental
regulation. A comparison of House constituencies below and
above the national mean per capita income attains an interesting
and distinct result (see Table 2).
Table2
Mean League of Conservation Voters Congressional Vote Scores
by Constituency Per Capita Income
House of Representatives .

/03'J Congress ( 1993-94)
104'• Congress ( 1995-96)
105'• Congress ( 1997-98)
106'• Congress (1999-2000)
I 01• Congress (200 I -02)
108• Congress (2003-04)
***p< .001: **p< .01; *p < .05

Mean LCV Score

Mean LCV Score

Constituencywi1h
Below Average

Constituency with

Per Capita Income

Above Average
Per Capita Income

T-Ratio

48.58
41.26
39.12
40 .65
40.41
45.44

53.16
48.83
55.31
52.93
54.54
47.61

- 1.583
-2.246*

-5.241***
-3.570••·
-4.009***

-.557

Representatives representing constituencies with per capita
income above the national mean have higher LCV vote scores
than representatives representing constituencies below the national mean. This difference was statistically significant for each
\'OL.
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Congress from the 104th to the I 07 1\ This suggests that members
of Congress from relatively wealthier constituencies tend to be
more supportive of environmental legislation endorsed by the
LCV, corresponding with the research findings that these constituencies should favor greater environmental protection.

Region
Another potential influence on congressional support for environmental legislation is the region of the country that a member of Congress represents. Significant public policy variations
among the states have been found to vary along cultural and regional lines (Elazar, 1984). Though research on the relationships
between region and policies has produced mixed results (Kincaid, 1982), Erikson, Wright, and Mel ver (1993) find that state
politics vary along regional lines . One explanation is based on
the history of westward migration and its resultant distribution
pattern of various cultural groups across the United States
(Elazar, 1984).
Of particular importance are the Northeast and the South.
These are the two regions of the country that have distinct policy
preferences from the nation as a whole. For example, in a multivariate analysis of state usage of the death penalty, Nice (1992)
finds that the addition of a dummy variable for the South affects
the findings for the execution rates for the states, indicating that
region is an influence on state's implementation of the death
penalty. Ideologically, the states of the Northeast are significantly more liberal than the United States as a whole, while
southern states are substantially more conservative (Erikson,
Wright, and Mciver, 1993). These ideological leanings can be
seen in how the Northeast and South vote as well: in the 2004
presidential election John Kerry won every state in the Northeast
with the exception of West Virginia and George W. Bush won
every state in the South. At the same time, northeastern states
THE JOURNAL
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(with the exception of West Virginia) tend to be among the
wealthiest states in the country while the South, on a per capita
income basis, is the poorest region of the country . Thus, the relationship between region and environmental policy may be informative because it combines some of the attributes of
partisanship and wealth.
Figure 1
One-Way ANO VA of League of Conservation
Congressional Vote Scores by Region
House of Representatives
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Regions are defined as followed :
East : CT, DE, ME, MD, MA, NH , NJ, NY . PA, RI, WY, VT
South : AL, AR , FL, GA , KY , LA, MS, NC, OK , SC, TN , TX , VA
Midwest : IL , IN , IA , KS, Ml , MN , MO , NB , ND , OH, SD, WI
West : AK , AZ, CA, CO, HI , ID, MT, NV , NM , OR , UT, WA, WY
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Comparing the LCV vote scores of members of Congress by
region reveals the same pattern. A one way ANOVA by region
suggests important differences in the mean LCV scores of congressional representatives (see Figure ]). In each Congress from
the 103rd to IOst\ the mean LCV scores for representatives from
the Northeast and South regions were significantly different than
those of the West and Midwest, which did not significantly differ
from one another or the national mean LCV scores. Members of
Congress from the Northeast (ranging from 64-70) had substantially higher mean LCV scores, and southern representatives had
substantially lower LCV vote scores (ranging from 28-41). The
mean LCV vote scores of Congress members from the West
(ranging from 43-53) and Midwest (ranging from 41-51), are
representative of the national average (ranging from 46-51 ). This
suggests that Northeastern representatives tend to be the most
supportive of environmental protection legislation and Southern
representatives the least supportive, with Western and Midwestern representatives in between the extremes of the Northeast and
South.
Analysis and Results

Ordinary Least Squares models were utilized for the 103rd to
}Ogth Congresses (1993-2004) in the House of Representatives to
determine the relative importance of constituency characteristics
on voting behavior of representatives. All of the independent
variables tested were statistically significant at p<.001 for every
Congress (Table 3). The dependent variable of legislators' LCV
vote scores were regressed on the independent variables of party
affiliation, constituency presidential choice, constituency per
capita income, and region. The qualitative variables of party affiliation, constituency presidential choice, and region were included in the regression as dummy variables. The Republican
Party was the omitted variable for both party affiliation and conTIJE JOl!IRNAL

or
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stituency presidential choice . For region the omitted variable was
the combination of the West and Midwe st region . As shown previously, the one-way ANOVA analysi s found no statisticall y significant difference between both of these region s and the overall
mean of all region s. The coefficients are interpreted as the difference between the dummy variables and the omitted variabl e. For
example, the coefficient on the Northea st region is interpreted as
the effect on LCV score relative to being from the West or Mid west region .
The regression results indicate that Democratic legislators are
more likely to support pro-environmental legislation than
Table3
lntluences on League of Conservation Voters Congressional Vote Scores
House of Representative s
League of Conservation Voters
Congressional Vote Scores
b
(t value/

Congresses
Va riable
Co nstant
Democra tic Party
Affili ation
Democ ratic Presidential Vote
Per Capita Income
Northeas t
South
R-squared
Standard Error of
Estimate
F
N

103"' (93-94)

I 04"' (95-96)

l0 5"' (97-98)

-2 1.979
(-4.846)***
40.766
(2 1.169)***
.6 12
(7.972)••·
1.559
(7.885)***
7.404
(3.549)***
-7.858
(-4.22 1)***
.709
16.388

-35. 128
(-6 .896)***
42 .860
( 19.400)***
.8 10
(9.034)••·
1.722
(7.9 14)***
11.120
(4.842)***
-7.343
(-3.575)***
.740
18.072

-37.576
(-6. 729)***
32 . 125
( 14 . 129)***
.846
(9 . 145)***
1.901
(8.520)***
7.902
(3.253)***
-8.717
(-4.077)***
.684
18.747

208 .589***
533

243 .966***
532

185.259***
533
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Table 3, cont'd
Congresses
Variable
Constant
Democra tic Party
Affiliation
Democra tic Presidential Vote
Per Capi ta Inco me
Northeas t
South

106 th (99-00)

107 th (0 1-02)

108 th (03-04)

-36.23 1
(-7 .358)***
45 .925
(22.7 12)***
.78 1
(9.47 7)***
1.5 10
(7.778)***
7 .552
(3.549)***
-8.042
(-4.306)***
.798
16.408

-22.576
(-5.428)***
50.849
(26.253)***
.579
(8.027)***
1.207
(6.599)***
8.590
(34.27 1)***
-9.863
(-5.527)***
.828
15.592

-35.095
(-6.807)***
57 .693
(26.775)***
.700
(8.593)***
.000
(6.035)***
6.945
(3.355)***
-4.902
(-2.628)**
.84 1
16.165

4 11.069***
533

45 1.504***
533

R-square d
Standard Error of
Estimate
F
338.520***
532
N
***p < .00 1; **p < .0 1; *p < .05

Republican legislators. This is consistent with a general trend in
party polarization in the House of Representative s over the past
three decade s (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). Congre ss has found
it difficult to reach agreements on environment al policy because
of the sharp ideologic al divisions between the parties. The partisan nature of environmental policy in recent years may be to
some degree the result of the representational nature of Congress. Congre ssional districts represented by Democratic members of Congre ss tend to be significantly different
demographically and politically than those districts represented
by Republican s (Fisher, 2005 ; Clausen, 1973). This dynamic has
the potential to dramatically influence the environmental policies
that representative s will support because in the process of representing the views of their constituent s, members of Congress are
moving toward very different legislative priorities . Members of
T I IEJOURNAL
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Congress, therefore, may be simply responding to different portions of their constituencies (Fiorina, 1974). The general trend in
party polarization may also be exacerbated in terms of environmental policy by the realization that the "pollution control problem" is much more complex and costly than initially anticipated
in the 1970s (Kraft, 2000).
Partisanship in Congress may be reinforced by the prevalence
of divided government, in which one party controls at least one
house of Congress and the other party controls the White House.
Divided government creates incentives for Congress to use divisive public policy debates on so-called "wedge issues" in order
to damage the opposing party in future elections (Rose, 200 l ).
Separation of powers, therefore, should be viewed as an important influence on congressional roll call behavior (Fiorina, 1996).
Our findings, however, suggest that the prevalence of divided
government appears to have no affect on congressional LCV
vote scores. The LCV vote scores for the l 03 rd Congress and
l08' h Congress (eras in which one party-the Democrats for the
I03 rd and the Republicans for the I 08 th--controlled both the
White House and both chambers of Congress) do not vary substantially from the LCV vote scores of congresses with divided
government.
Besides partisanship, a constituency's political preferences as
measured through its presidential vote, the per capita income of
the constituency , and whether or not the constituency is in the
Northeast or South are strongly related to a representative's LCV
vote scores. The higher the constituency 's Democratic vote for
president, the higher the representative 's LCV vote scores. Thus,
legislators with constituents that supported the Democratic
presidential candidate (i.e., Clinton in I 992 and 1996, Gore in
2000) are more likely to support pro-environmental legislation .
Similarly, the per capita income of a legislator's constituency is
positively related to the legislator's support for pro\'OL.
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environmental policy; members of Congress from wealthier districts tend to be more supportive of environmental legislation.
Finally, in regards to region, representing a constituency from the
Northeast region makes a legislator relatively more likely to
support pro-environmental legislation while representing a constituency from the South region makes a legislator relatively less
likely to support pro-environmental legislation.
The R-squares for all six models are quite high, but importantly there is a consistent upward trend for the R-squares from
the 103rd Congress to 10th Congress . While the R-square for the
103rd Congress is .655, the R-square for the 108th Congress is
.835 . This implies that the variables tested have become even
more important determinants of congressional LCV vote scores.
Conclusion
Using higher LCV scores to indicate a greater propensity to
vote pro-environment, our results for the House of Representatives correspond with Nelson 's (2002) findings in the Senate that
the two most important predictors of a representative's environmental voting pattern are party affiliation and region. In regards
to partisanship, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to
cast pro-environment votes. As for region, representatives from
the West and Midwest represent the national average in terms of
environmental voting patterns, while Northeastern representatives are more likely to vote more pro-environment, and Southern representatives are less likely to vote pro-environment. We
also find that periods of divided government do not play a role in
environmental voting patterns in the House, which is consistent
with Nelson 's (2002) findings for the U.S. Senate. Finally, our
results show that the independent variables used in our analysis
continue to become more consistent predictors of House environmental voting patterns.
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Our findings suggest some potentially interesting ideas for future research. Environmental policy includes legislative issues
ranging from energy use, to atmospheric deposition, to the protection of endangered plants and animals. In addition, environmental policy regulates the actions of government, business, and
private citizens. Nelson (2002) argues that the broader the set of
environmental votes being analyzed, the larger the role of ideology in voting patterns. Future research may benefit by focusing
on more narrowly defined categories of environmental policy, as
it may change the significance of particular constituency variables. For example, while region is found to be an important factor in explaining the variation in LCV scores for members of
Congress, there is no clear explanation as to why this is the case.
Focusing on more narrowly defined sub-categories of environmental policy may shed light on some of the underlying reasons
for strong regional effects. The same may be true for other constituency factors as well, which may lead to important findings
regarding the creation of environmental policy in a representative democracy.
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